Files
chatgpt-on-wechat/tests/test_security_read_env_bypass.py

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Python

# encoding:utf-8
"""
Unit tests for Read tool credential-bypass protection (issue #2913).
Verifies that the read tool blocks not just the literal ~/.cow/.env file but
also its process-environment aliases (/proc/<pid>/environ) and symlinks that
resolve to it, WITHOUT re-broadening the scope narrowed by #2863.
"""
import os
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".."))
from agent.tools.read.read import Read
from common.utils import expand_path
_DENIED = "Access denied"
class TestReadCredentialBypass(unittest.TestCase):
"""_is_credential_path must block credential files and their aliases."""
def setUp(self):
self.read = Read()
# ---- happy path: ordinary files are NOT blocked -----------------------
def test_normal_file_not_blocked(self):
"""A regular temp file must not be treated as a credential path."""
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=".txt", delete=False) as tf:
tf.write(b"hello world")
tmp_path = tf.name
try:
self.assertFalse(self.read._is_credential_path(tmp_path))
result = self.read.execute({"path": tmp_path})
self.assertEqual(result.status, "success")
finally:
os.unlink(tmp_path)
def test_non_environ_proc_file_not_blocked(self):
"""Non-environ /proc files must not be over-blocked (no #2863 regression)."""
self.assertFalse(self.read._is_credential_path("/proc/self/status"))
self.assertFalse(self.read._is_credential_path("/proc/1/cmdline"))
# ---- control: the literal credential file stays blocked --------------
def test_direct_env_file_blocked(self):
"""Direct ~/.cow/.env access must remain blocked (regression control)."""
env_path = expand_path("~/.cow/.env")
self.assertTrue(self.read._is_credential_path(env_path))
result = self.read.execute({"path": env_path})
self.assertEqual(result.status, "error")
self.assertIn(_DENIED, str(result.result))
# ---- the vulnerability: environ aliases are blocked ------------------
def test_proc_self_environ_blocked(self):
"""/proc/self/environ must be blocked (the #2913 bypass)."""
self.assertTrue(self.read._is_credential_path("/proc/self/environ"))
result = self.read.execute({"path": "/proc/self/environ"})
self.assertEqual(result.status, "error")
self.assertIn(_DENIED, str(result.result))
def test_proc_pid_environ_blocked(self):
"""/proc/<pid>/environ must be blocked for any pid."""
self.assertTrue(self.read._is_credential_path("/proc/1/environ"))
self.assertTrue(self.read._is_credential_path(f"/proc/{os.getpid()}/environ"))
def test_proc_thread_self_environ_blocked(self):
"""/proc/thread-self/environ must be blocked."""
self.assertTrue(self.read._is_credential_path("/proc/thread-self/environ"))
# ---- symlink escape --------------------------------------------------
@unittest.skipUnless(hasattr(os, "symlink"), "symlink not supported")
def test_symlink_to_env_file_blocked(self):
"""A symlink resolving to ~/.cow/.env must be blocked."""
env_path = expand_path("~/.cow/.env")
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(env_path), exist_ok=True)
created_env = False
if not os.path.exists(env_path):
with open(env_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
f.write("SECRET=canary\n")
created_env = True
link_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp()
link_path = os.path.join(link_dir, "innocent.txt")
try:
os.symlink(env_path, link_path)
except (OSError, NotImplementedError):
self.skipTest("cannot create symlink in this environment")
try:
self.assertTrue(self.read._is_credential_path(link_path))
finally:
os.unlink(link_path)
os.rmdir(link_dir)
if created_env:
os.unlink(env_path)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()